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Setback in Burlington
Pierre Clavel
Burlington, Vermont elected socialist Bernie    Sanders mayor in 1981; he and his successors 
developed a progressive regime that ran the city for the 
next 31 years. The result was a demonstration of what a 
city could do once the ideological hegemony of business 
interests was broken and popular participation got 
serious access to city hall. 
But the progressive administration, well developed 
administratively and with strong support in the city 
population, and its well elaborated set of nonprofits 
and supportive business elements, suffered a setback 
in the 2012 election. This may be the occasion to take 
stock: what was accomplished, and what are the les-
sons as far as sustainability of progressive politics? 
Thirty-one Years of Progressive Government
The accomplishments were substantial. Sanders, 
who was committed to opening up the city’s gov-
ernment and to economic development initiatives 
that would favor the city’s poor and working class 
residents, initially faced fierce resistance from the 
Aldermen and city departments and commissions. 
He responded by appointing advisory commis-
sions and taking his program to the people. 
Early on, he convinced key business leadership that 
he supported development, “so long as it was eq-
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uitable.” Businesses wanted development, but even 
more they wanted a stable investment environment. 
Sanders, they came to realize, could deliver that by 
creating a balance between business needs and neigh-
borhood needs. As quoted in my book, The Progressive 
City, Downtown business leader Nick Wylie said:
 First, he is competent. He is running the city. 
Second, he is pro-development. He really 
wants it. He has figured out that it is a cow 
to be milked. He wants to build his tax base. 
Previously there was this lurking presence . . . 
low-income people who could rise up and stop 
any project. [The previous mayor ] was not deal-
ing with them. Sanders has dealt them in. 
In 1982 Sanders, in a key move, got business 
support for a Community Economic Development 
Office (CEDO). At the same time, he took the first 
steps toward Neighborhood Planning Assemblies 
(NPAs) in each of the city’s six wards, signaling 
that people would have new channels to city hall. 
CEDO
After winning re-election and progressives gaining city 
council seats, the mayor put the new organization in 
place by mid-1983. Peter Clavelle, who had been city 
manager in neighboring Winooski, became the CEDO 
Director, and soon there were key staff appointments 
with assistant directors for three main functions. 
Community Development. Michael Monte, who 
had been a community organizer, then in the plan-
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ning department, moved to CEDO as the Assistant 
Director for Community Development and took 
over the two high visibility initiatives. He managed 
the NPAs, which, at one point, had annual budgets 
of $15,000 each, competing for shares of the federal 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) 
funds. They were still functioning thirty years later.
Higher visibility was the development of the Burlington 
Waterfront, which Sanders had made an issue in his 
1981 campaign victory. Cleanup of derelict indus-
trial land ensued, with development of a community 
boathouse and promenade through the 1990s, and a 
mix of luxury and afford-
able housing nearby.
Economic Development. 
Bruce Seifer, who took on 
the central responsibility 
for economic development 
within CEDO in 1985, 
noted early on the burden 
of satisfying a business 
constituency that had res-
ervations about a “socialist” 
mayor. “We [CEDO] were 
doing all these community 
oriented things – my job 
was to deal with the business side,” as he later put it. 
This meant servicing the largest employers’ demands 
so they would stay in the city; but another way Seifer 
excelled, was indefatigable networking: meeting and 
listening and connecting businesses and would-be en-
trepreneurs to sources of assistance. It was as much 
a matter of responding to imaginative and socially 
oriented business leadership as push from city hall.
One thing that did come from city hall was a plan – 
called Jobs and People – with an analysis of economic 
potential in the city’s labor force, its workers and po-
tential entrepreneurs. It came from two consultants, 
Christopher Mackin and Beth Siegel, working with 
CEDO. While the surrounding Chittenden County 
had a growing high tech manufacturing base, most 
of the employment was from absentee owned branch 
plants; purchasing was more than normally from out-
side the area. These characteristics, combined with 
a surfeit of underemployed professional workers, 
suggested the need for local entrepreneurs and own-
ership, who constituted a core political constituency 
for the progressive administration in Burlington. 
Jobs and People suggested a focus on local ownership: 
indications were that locally owned establishments 
tended to stay in locations longer, purchase locally to 
a greater extent and even perform as good citizens 
more than absentee owned firms. And they had local 
examples – Ben and Jerry’s ice cream had started up 
in a Burlington North End garage, and was already 
contributing ice 
cream to local events. 
Business associations 
of various types 
formed. Vermont 
Businesses for Social 
Responsibility (VBSR) 
was an association 
organized around 
environmental 
improvement projects. 
At one point Seifer 
got VBSR to form a 
Vermont Sustainable 
Jobs Fund supporting 
the development of the state’s green economy.
Housing policy was a somewhat separate opera-
tion within CEDO. Clavelle and his main deputy, 
Michael Monte, thought of housing in a community 
development framework – different from the real es-
tate orientation in many cities – and Brenda Torpy, 
who became the Assistant Director for Housing, 
began by convincing her colleagues of the cen-
tral importance of maintaining affordability for low 
end units in the face of development pressures. 
The vehicle they discovered was the commu-
nity land trust (CLT), a model being developed at 
the Institute for Community Economics (ICE) in 
Western Massachusetts. Torpy convinced Sanders 
and CEDO to contract with ICE for the services of 
John Davis, who spent several months in Burlington 
walking the streets and organizing interest in the 
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device in the city’s working class North End and 
other neighborhoods. The eventual result was 
the Burlington Community Land Trust (BCLT), 
which Torpy helped lead as board president.
Torpy resigned as CEDO’s housing director in 1986 
– eventually to become CEO of BCLT – and Davis 
moved in as her successor, where he shepherded 
several policy initiatives aimed at making increasing 
proportions of the city housing stock “permanently 
affordable.” He called it a “ladder of affordability,” 
to signify the interconnectedness of the several pol-
icies emerging from CEDO. One seemed to lead to 
another: a Condominium Conversion Ordinance in 
1987, Housing Trust Fund in 1989, followed by voter 
approval of a one-cent per every one hundred dollars 
of the property tax assessment contributed to that. 
The city adopted Inclusionary Zoning in 1990. Davis 
left in 1994, but housing policy had continuity under 
Brian Pine (1990s to present). By 2010, according to 
Pine’s estimate, 17 percent of the city’s housing stock 
was permanently price protected and affordable. 
Sustainable Progressivism
Sanders resigned the mayoralty in 1989 to run for 
Congress. Clavelle succeeded him, while Monte took 
over CEDO. Progressives held the mayoralty for 29 of 
31 years between Sander’s first victory in 1981, and 
the succession of Democrat Miro Weinberger in 2012. 
Clavelle held the mayorality from 1989 until he retired 
in 2006, except for two years (1993–1995). Those two 
years of a Republican mayor weren’t enough to roll back 
CEDO policy achievements, largely because the city’s 
housing policy had delegated significant authority to 
non-profits like the BCLT. According to Davis, writing 
in his book, The Affordable City, a pragmatic approach 
led to this devolution of power: “. . . there was an ev-
er-present apprehension among Sanders’s supporters 
and staff that each year might be their last.” Therefore 
they sought initiatives that would outlive their hold on 
city hall: “. . . a nonprofit infrastructure should be estab-
lished outside City Hall – independent of City Hall . . .” 
Clavelle, a left of center Democrat, seemed a more 
moderate leftist than Sanders. The sequence of 
Sanders and Clavelle was a good one. Sanders had 
established a committment to redistribution; Clavelle 
added a concern for the softer side of social justice 
– exemplified in his support for environmental 
sustainability and for nonprofits. The signal example of 
the first may have been the Intervale project, begun by 
entrepreneur Will Rapp who organized volunteers to 
start cleaning up a largely derelict floodplain. Eventually 
CEDO had financed the purchase of the area, and 
by the end of the 1990s the area was transformed 
into an urban farm, a mecca for visitors who had 
ideas about urban agriculture and food systems. 
Progressives Out of Gas? Bob Kiss and Burlington Telecom
In hindsight, several things came together in 2012 
that put in question the policies the city had been 
successfully pursuing since 1981. Bob Kiss, who 
succeeded to the mayoralty as the Progressive 
party candidate in 2006, had served since 1981 
as executive director of the county and regional 
poverty agencies. Kiss did not discontinue Clavelle’s 
emphases, and he was a competent manager in 
most respects, but he was reticent, less agile with 
his rhetoric. And when handed a perfect storm of 
a crisis, he proved unequal to the task of making 
clear his actions and the issues behind them.
The crisis was the failure of the city-owned fiber 
optic network Burlington Telecom (BT), due to 
mismanagement, and an unauthorized, undisclosed 
transfer from the city’s general fund that failed 
to shore it up during the 2008 fiscal crisis. This 
was revealed in late 2009 after Kiss had been re-
elected to a second term. Less than one year into 
his second three-year term, Kiss was anathema. 
The upshot was that Burlington’s progressives, who had 
built three decades of mayoral control on a reputation 
for competence alongside their social justice concerns, 
did not field a candidate in the 2012 mayoral elections. 
A businessman and former real estate developer, centrist 
Democrat Miro Weinberger, won the election and the 
progressives were left to see what they could salvage. As 
one commented later, “They had a thirty year record, 
and then threw it all away.”
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Weinberger as Successor 
Miro Weinberger came into Burlington’s mayoralty in 
2012. He could have tried to clean house, but did not. 
In the run-up to a likely re-election in 2015, at least 
two issues remain unresolved: Burlington Telecom 
has been put on hold, and the mayor, having an-
nounced an “affordability crisis” in market rate hous-
ing, faces questions from progressives long committed 
to a diverse income mix in any new construction.
Once in office, Weinberger tried to make the case 
for selling BT, though given regulatory hurdles, 
4,000 subscribers, and much improved management, 
the outcome is uncertain; there is a possibility that 
progressives might be able to save significant city 
control. And, at least on the surface, Weinberger has 
retained an interest in affordable housing, maintaining 
CEDO’s longtime housing director and being 
careful to praise progressive accomplishments in 
maintaining the affordable part of the housing stock. 
His challenge was to see what he could do with the 
real estate developers – an important constituency, 
long accustomed to city hall resistance but now happy 
with one of their own in the mayor’s office. In June 
2013, Weinberger released a Downtown Housing 
Strategy, advocating increased density and a policy 
focus on “market rate” housing. The premise is that 
this would increase supply and prevent the loss of 
“young professionals” from the city population (and 
the Democrats’ voting base). But progressives are pre-
pared to resist any housing policy that does not strike a 
balance between “affordable” and “market rate” units. 
There does seem to be a progressive future for the city. 
True, electing a Democrat was uncharted territory for 
the progressives. Unlike Clavelle, rather than building 
up the nonprofit political infrastructure, Weinberger 
brought his own – real estate developers, a segment of 
the local political class that had long been marginalized 
or selectively used by Sanders and his successors. But 
the progressives have created many bulwarks to main-
tain their policy approach – an affordable housing co-
alition based in nonprofits like the Champlain Housing 
Trust, and a diverse set of businesses with at least some 
claim to social justice concerns. They will be a strong 
force, and it will be interesting to see how the various 
interests play out.   P2
